A Fool Does Not Delight in Understanding

Major General Charles A. Willoughby served as MacArthur's (see previous posts) G-2, or intelligence chief, during the Korean war. As G-2, Willoughby gathered and reported intelligence assessments to his commanding officer. The point, naturally, is to give accurate, timely, unbiased information based on a fusion of as many intelligence sources as possible. The question is this: Was he good at his job or did he feed MacArthur the assessments he wanted to hear? It seems clear he was not a likable sort - his subordinates called him "Sir Charles" behind his back - at least, that's what is in print. One source paints him, however, with respect to the assessment of the Chinese army, fairly positively:
Kenneth J. Campbell reports on the Arlington National Cemetery Website the following about Major General Charles A. Willoughby: "In early November 1950, roughly forty Chinese soldiers had been captured during several weeks of combat. During interrogation, many of these troops correctly identified their units and gave reasonably accurate information on the large number of Chinese Communist soldiers who had already crossed the Yalu (River). On 2 November 1950 General Willoughby estimated that 16,500 Chinese soldiers were in North Korea, and about 516,000 regulars and 274,000 irregular troops were in Manchuria. The CIA was not concerned with the above information, rating these reports in the F-6 category, which meant that neither the content nor the source was taken very seriously by their analysts. On 5 November 1950 General Willoughby warned that the Chinese Communist forces had the capability of launching an attack at any time. On 10 November 1950 Willoughby's intelligence summary, a reversal of his 28 October report, predicted an "all out" Chinese attack on UN forces. On 15 November Willoughby reported: Information received from Chinese Nationalist military sources ... gives strong support to an assumption that the Chinese Communists intend to "throw the book" at United Nations forces in Korea.... It is fast becoming apparent that an excessive number of troops are entering Northeast China."
Let's say David Halberstam's Coldest Winter paints a different portrait. Consider these Index headings for Willoughby: Chinese presence discounted by; enemy underrated by; intelligence skewed by; OSS and CIA hated by...
Halberstam builds a strong case which contradicts Kenneth J. Campbell's description of Willoughby, offering reports from Army, Marine, and CIA intelligence officers and operations officers testifying to his arrogance and self-confidence - which belies good intelligence. Good intelligence comes from questioning, examining, doubting until the picture becomes clear. Of course - it rarely becomes perfectly clear.
"A great intelligence officer tries to take the unknown at least partially knowable; he tries to think like his enemy, and he listens carefully to those with whom he disagrees, simply because he knows that he has to challenge his own value system in order to understand the nature and impulse of the other side. In all ways, Charles Willoughby not only failed to fit this role, but was the very opposite of it. He was not harmless..." (The Coldest Winter; David Halberstam)