We'll Be Through In Three Days...Maybe Two

Leadership mistakes stand out in bold relief when lives are on the line. It is easy to criticize looking backwards. So we must endeavor to do so humbly. General McClellan's inactivity and uninformed view of himself demonstrates one leadership failure. Other men's actions or omissions, driven by self-glorification, demonstrate other failures - often at the cost of those serving under them.

Let's briefly consider Marine Major General William Rupertus. He led the campaign, noted by one of his own staff, as "the worst campaign in the history of warfare - far worse than Iwo Jima or the others." Wait - the worst campaign in the history of warfare? Quite a damning statement. What was the campaign and why was it so bad? A brief look.

The First Marines attacked the island of Peleliu in September 1944. After withstanding the characteristic naval and air bombardment by the U.S., the Japanese surfaced to fight with tenacious ferocity. Rupertus, described by David Halberstam, was "vainglorious, impetuous, contemptuous of the forces arrayed against him." He reportedly said of the forthcoming attack, "this is going to be a short one, a quickie. Rough but fast. We'll be through in three days. It might take only two." Notice he was interested in personal glory and did not take his enemy seriously. This doesn't bode well for those who follow such leaders. He overestimated himself and underestimated the enemy. Overestimating an enemy leads to inactivity and underestimating the enemy can lead to disastrous consequences.

As was their practice, the Japanese prepared underground networks of caves and reinforced their positions to withstand the initial bombardment. David Halberstam writes of the operation, "Instead (of three days) it took a full month of yard by yard, cave by cave fighting. It had taken, the Marines estimated later, almost sixteen hundred rounds of ammo, both heavy and light, to kill each of the ten thousand Japanese soldiers on the island." (The Coldest Winter; Hyperion; 2007; p. 430)

Perhaps Halberstam was too hard on Rupertus, I don't know but plan further reading. The leadership problems he highlights have consequences in any setting. Isn't it wise to consider the mistakes of those we study while being circumspect lest we fall into the same pit?